Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 52
Issue 2 Seventh Circuit Review

Article 13

October 1975

Reasonable Suspicion of Illegal Alienage as a Precondition to
Stops of Suspected Aliens
Ronald A. Stevens
Ronald A. Stevens

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ronald A. Stevens & Ronald A. Stevens, Reasonable Suspicion of Illegal Alienage as a Precondition to
Stops of Suspected Aliens, 52 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 485 (1975).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol52/iss2/13

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

REASONABLE SUSPICION OF ILLEGAL ALIENAGE AS A
PRECONDITION TO "STOPS" OF SUSPECTED ALIENS
Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod,
398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. 111. 1975).
A conservative estimate in 1972 produced a figure of about one
million, but the Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally in
the country. Whatever the number, these aliens create significant
economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal
resident aliens for jobs, and generating extra demand for social
services.1
So concluded the Supreme Court in its recent evaluation of the seriousness of the illegal alien problem in the United States. The recent case of
Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod2 presented a confrontation between the
strong governmental interest in regulating aliens, legal and illegal, 3 and the
fourth amendment freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which has been described by the Supreme Court as "the very essence of
constitutional liberty."'4 It is clearly established that aliens are covered by
this fundamental right, 5 but the law is evolving as to the precise nature of
the fourth amendment protection as applied to Immigration and Naturalization Service 6 enforcement of immigration law.
In
persons
refining
conflict

setting a standard governing I.N.S. stops and brief interrogations of
suspected to be aliens, Illinois Migrant Council contributed to the
of ,this developing area of law, but in so doing, created a direct
with decisions in two other circuits. 7 Granting a preliminary

1. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S. Ct. 2574,2579 (1975).

2. 398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill. 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-2019, 7th Cir.,

Nov. 5, 1975.
3. The thrust of this interest centers on the regulation of illegal aliens and the
discussion herein will deal primarily with this area; however, since the government

expressed concern over the effect of Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod on the monitoring
of legal aliens, this issue will be discussed in note 21 infra.

4. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947).
5. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
6. Hereinafter referred to as I.N.S.
7. The approach taken by a third circuit was implicitly repudiated by the United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce holding. The Tenth Circuit had developed a line of cases

which permitted vehicular stops even when virtually without reason. Stops had been
upheld based upon an officer's statement that "all six [occupants of the car] looked to

him like 'illegal Mexicans'" (United States v. Granado, 453 F.2d 769, 770 (10th Cir.
1972)), and the fact that the subjects were "persons of obviously [sic] Mexican descent"
(United States v. Saldana, 453 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir. 1972)). And in the most
recent case a person apparently not of Mexican descent was routinely stopped for
questioning to determine citizenship and the Court upheld that stop without identifying
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injunction restraining I.N.S. agents from detaining, stopping, interrogating or
otherwise interfering with persons of Mexican ancestry or Spanish surnames
who are lawfully in the country unless such stops are justified, the district
court defined the standard for justification. Persons may not be stopped
absent a "reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable facts that such
person is an alien unlawfully in the 'United States."'8 While not inconsistent
with the recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,9
upon which it heavily relied, Illinois Migrant Council goes beyond BrignoniPonce in deciding the very issue reserved by the Supreme Court: whether a
suspicion of illegal alienage, rather than one of mere alienage, is required in
order for I.N.S. stops to be permitted under the fourth amendment. 10 By
deciding this issue in the affirmative, and applying the standard to brief stops
constituting minimal intrusions, the district court extended the coverage of
the fourth amendment and presented a conflict which can be finally resolved
only by the Supreme Court.
In evaluating whether the Illinois Migrant Council standard is a correct
application of the fourth amendment to this area of governmental regulation,
this paper will discuss the factual setting upon which the decision was based,
and the few Supreme Court cases that have touched upon this area. The
decisions of the circuits in conflict with Illinois Migrant Council will be
examined and the standard therein will be compared to that of Illinois
Migrant Council in light of the Supreme Court cases, legal reasoning, and
practical application. It will be concluded that the Illinois Migrant Council
standard provides a reasonable balance between the conflicting interests of
effective governmental regulation and constitutional protection of individual
freedoms.
Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod
In their efforts to detect aliens, the I.N.S. officers confronted and
questioned several persons employed by the Illinois Migrant Council." Each
any circumstances on which reasonable suspicion of alienage could be based. United
States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973). It appears that the Tenth Circuit
would permit any and all stops so long as made in order to determine citizenship. This
view is clearly unconstitutional under United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, as discussed infra
in the section entitled "The Supreme Court Cases".
8. Preliminary Injunction Order, No. 74 C 3111 (N.D. Ill., issued July 29, 1975)
(emphasis added).

9. 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975).
10. Id. at 2582 n.9. It is this issue which the article will focus on. The other two
issues raised by the government in Illinois Migrant Council-whether a three judge court

should have been impanelled and whether the district court's standard would prohibit the
I.N.S. from monitoring legal aliens-are discussed infra at notes 19 and 21 and
accompanying text. See also note 3 supra.
11. The encounters complained of consisted of two types: street encounters and
"area control operations." This paper will consider that portion of the opinion which
appears to be the most seriously contested, namely the standard set for justifying street
encounters. The "area control operations" consisted of warrantless entries and searches
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of these persons was either a citizen of the United States or a legally resident
alien, and each claimed to have had his fourth amendment rights violated by
the I.N.S. officers. The suit growing out of these encounters sought to enjoin
the I.N.S. from "conducting . . . forcible stops and detentions without

probable cause or articulable facts showing that there is substantial reason to
believe such persons have entered the United States illegally.' 2 The
injunction was sought on behalf of the plaintiffs and all other persons of
Mexican ancestry and appearance.
The circumstances of -the encounters were as follows. 13 I.N.S. agents
spotted two of the plaintiffs, 'Elias Montanez and Larry Sandoval, in a car
travelling in the opposite direction. They made a U-turn and pulled up
alongside plaintiffs' car, which by then had parked at the Rochelle, Illinois,
office of the Illinois Migrant Council. Three agents exited their car and one
asked Montanez, a lawful resident alien, where he was born. After
answering, "Mexico", Montanez was asked to produce identification, which
he did only after the agent threatened to take Montanez to Chicago and put
him in jail. Apparently satisfied with Montanez' identification, the agents
then asked Sandoval, a citizen, and the 'Director of the Rochelle Illinois
Migrant Council office, to produce identification. Sandoval refused to
produce any identification, even after he was threatened with being taken to
Chicago. An agent then grabbed Sandoval's arm and placed him in the
I.N.S. car. When again asked for identification, Sandoval replied that he
did not think it was right for the officers to interfere with a citizen's rights.
Apparently this implied assertion of citizenship satisifed the officers, who
then released Sandoval.
The second incident involved Arturo Lopez, Deputy Director of the
Illinois Migrant Council, and occurred in downtown Chicago as Lopez was
walking to his office. Failing to identify themselves, two men approached
Lopez and asked if he lived "in the area". 'Believing the reference to be to
the immediate area, Lopez answered, "No, but I work around here". Lopez
was then asked where he was born; he replied by asking where the two men
were born. At this time the agents identified themselves. When Lopez then
told the agents he was born in New Mexico, the agents' interest apparently
ended.
of homes, dormitories, cottages and plants by I.N.S. agents. Conceding that no probable
cause existed, the Government relied on the claim that consent was given. After ruling
that the persons subjected to the searches and interrogations had not given consent, the
court further held that the standard governing stops and interrogations within a plant

setting is the same as that covering street encounters: reasonable suspicion based upon
specific articulable facts that the subject is an illegal alien. Presumably, such reasonable
suspicion could be founded upon sufficiently reliable information that illegal aliens were
employed in a specific plant.
12. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 29.
13. 398 F. Supp. at 887-88.
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It is principally these encounters which plaintiffs claimed constituted
unconstitutional seizures. 14 The district court ruled that such stops were not
permissible under the fourth amendment unless specific facts existed upon
which a reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage could be founded and held
that such facts were not present in these encounters.
The government asserted that the standard requiring a reasonable
suspicion of the subject's illegal alienage was too high a standard of
justification.' 5 Instead, it was argued, the reasonable suspicion of alienage
alone should be sufficient. The thrust of this argument rested on three
propositions: (1) that I.N.S. stops have statutory authorization when meeting the lower standard, and since any higher standard would thereby void
the statute, only a three judge court could require a higher standard; (2)
that the Illinois Migrant Council standard would prohibit the I.N.S. from
monitoring legal aliens even though such aliens have consented to such
monitoring as a condition to -being permitted entrance and residence in the
United States; and (3) that the minimal intrusion involved in "mere
questioning", when weighed against the strong governmental interest at
stake, warranted only the lower standard.
The first proposition maintained that since the actions complained of in
Illinois Migrant Council were pursuant to statute, an attack on their constitutionality constituted an attack on the constitutionality of the statute itself,
thus requiring the impanelling of a three judge court.' 6 The statute which
the government believed plaintiffs to be challenging provides:
Any officer or employee of the [Immigration and Naturalization]
Service authorized under regulations described by the Attorney
General shall have the power without warrant
(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be 7an alien
as to his right to be or to remain in the United States.'
The argument was that a standard requiring reasonable suspicion of illegal
alienage, rather than mere alienage, would render this section void and
unenforceable. The attack would be not merely upon administrative action,
but upon the Act of Congress.
The plaintiffs insisted' s that they were not challenging the statute, but
rather the actions of the administrative agency which go beyond the require14. One other street encounter occurring during an "area control operation" was
cited by plaintiffs, but the facts there were so similar it is unnecessary to recite them,
especially since the court dealt principally with those street encounters described herein.
The area control operations are briefly discussed in note 11 supra.
15. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
6-9.
16. Id. at 12-14.
17.

8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1970).

18. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 25-
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ments of the statute and thereby stand alone, subject to a determination of

unconstitutionality by a single district court judge. Agreeing with the
plaintiffs, the district court held that since the agents' actions were not
required by the statute and were not the mere perfunctory application
thereof, the constitutionality of the statute need not be in issue. 19
The government's second proposition-the claim that the I.N.S.' ability

to monitor legal aliens would be jeopardized by the standard-was expressly
raised only after the preliminary injunction was issued. In its Motion for
19. 398 F. Supp. at 892. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970),
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution
of the United States shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof
unless the application thereof is heard and determined by a district court of
three judges under section 2284 of this title.
It is clear that a three judge court is not necessary for the construction of a statute.
Query v. United States, 316 U.S. 486 (1942); Ex Parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461, 466-67
(1926). It is equally clear that questions of the constitutionality of a statute are to be
deferred, where possible, until all other issues in a case are resolved, in order to avoid
both the convening of a three judge court unnecessarily and the consideration by such a
court of issues which could have been decided by a single judge. Wyman v. Rothstein,
398 U.S. 275 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Kelly v. Illinois Bell
Tel., 325 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1963).
Illinois Migrant Council, however, does not present the option of avoiding constitutional issues entirely. The constitutionality of administrative action, if not that of a
statute, is at issue. If the administrative action can be severed from the statute, thus
removing the constitutionality of the statute itself from issue, and with it any need for a
three judge court, the single judge district court can then decide the constitutionality of
the administrative action. The Second Circuit view is that the single judge district court
should, where possible, construe statutes such that it is the constitutionality of administrative action, rather than that of the statute which is in issue. Sardino v. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966). This view was followed in
Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974, 978 (D.D.C. 1972), where the court held that a
challenge to "administrative action which is permitted but not required by broad
legislative policy and which resulted from the exercise of administrative judgment and
initiative" does not constitute a challenge to the Act, and therefore, is within the
jurisdiction of a single judge district court. This view is strongly reinforced by the
general proposition that three judge court statutes, including section 2282, are to be
narrowly construed and sparingly applied. Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970);
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
There remains the question of whether the statute in question can be so construed in
this case. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court construed the statute to imply a
reasonable suspicion of alienage requirement. 95 S. Ct. at 2582. The fact that the very
purpose of the questioning under section 1357(a)(1) is limited to determining the
lawfulness of the subject's presence in this country would seem to permit a further
inference that the agent must have some suspicion that the subject is not lawfully in this
country. Cf. United States v. Bell, 383 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Neb. 1974).
The statute certainly does not expressly exempt the I.N.S. agents from a requirement of reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, and to read such a requirement into the
statute would not violate the language of the statute or render the statute meaningless.
Rather, it would merely clarify the standard required, short of a warrant, before such
questioning could commence. Therefore, the construction given the statute by the court
is one which leaves the statute in force, leaving only the constitutionality of the
administrative action in issue. It is then the administrative action which was found to be
unconstitutional, and such finding was within the jurisdiction of a single judge district
court.
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Clarification of Preliminary Injunction Order, the government argued that
the decision not only unduly hinders the I.N.S. enforcement of statutes, but
renders such statutes null and void. 20 The plaintiffs disputed the contention
that the Illinois Migrant Council standard would prevent the monitoring of
known aliens; they maintained that the standard neither unduly restricts the
21
I.N.S. nor challenges any statute.
20. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) [1970], requires every alien (immigrant
or non-immigrant) eighteen years of age and over to carry with him at all
times a certificate of alien registration or alien receipt card. Failure to do so
subjects him to a possible misdemeanor conviction netting a maximum of a
$100 fine and a 30 day prison term. Furthermore, 8 U.S.C. § 1305 [1970] requires every alien (immigrant or non-immigrant) to register with the Attorney
General annually, and failure to do so subjects him to a possible fine of $200
and 30 day prison term. See 8 U.S.C. § 1306(b) [19701. Moreover, even an
alien, legally in the country, who fails to apply for registration or to be fingerprinted is subject to criminal sanctions including a $1,000 fine and six months
imprisonment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) [1970]. Thus, if an I.N.S. agent, under
the terms of the Opinion, is precluded from stopping a legal alien to make a
limited inquiry as to his right to be in the United States, or to request to see
his certificate of alien registration-even though the agent reasonably suspects
on the basis of specific articulable facts, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the person in question is an alien-then, realistic enforcement of
§§ 1304, 1305 and 1306 becomes, at best, a mere illusion, and the statutes
themselves become hollow representations of Congressional intent.
Motion for Clarification of Preliminary Injunction Order at 6-7. (emphasis in original).
21. At the time of this writing, the district court had not yet ruled on the
government's motion, but the government view appears to have been rejected in a similar
situation. An attempt was made in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973), to justify the search of a legal alien on the basis that it was administrative in
nature. The source for this contention consisted of a pair of Supreme Court cases which
had permitted searches of closely regulated and licensed businesses without warrants or
probable cause. (United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 79 (1970)). The argument that aliens conditionally
permitted to enter the United States were akin to a regulated business, and thus subject to
"administrative" searches absent probable cause, was denied. 413 U.S. at 271. The
Supreme Court thus refused to consider the regulation that is involved in immigration as
placing a person in the same category as a regulated business for the purposes of
administrative searches.
The other basis on which the Supreme Court distinguished Almeida-Sanchez from
Biswell and Colonade is equally relevant here. The businesses searched were known to
be within the scope of the regulation, whereas the alien searched in Almeida-Sanchez
was not known to be an alien at all. 413 U.S. at 271. Thus, administrative searches are
limited to subjects known to be within the coverage of the regulation involved. Applying
these principles to Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, it is not clear whether a category
of "administrative stops" is permissible at all, given the distinction between persons and
businesses which the Supreme Court identified in Almeida-Sanchez. If permissible, such
administrative stops should be limited to those persons known to be regulated-known
aliens-not persons merely suspected of being aliens.
Limited to the factual circumstances upon which it is based, Illinois Migrant
Council does not prohibit questioning of known aliens. There, the I.N.S. agents had no
knowledge of the alienage of any of the persons stopped. The issue of the government's
ability to maintain communication with known registered aliens is a different one from
the issue of whether I.N.S. agents may stop and interrogate anonymous persons on the
street merely because such persons are by their appearance or actions suspected by the
agents of being aliens.
In Almeida-Sanchez, the government's attempt to lower the requisite standard for
justifying searches merely on the basis of the alienage of the subject was outright
rejected; the government's argument in Illinois Migrant Council that the standard for
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The government's third proposition-which this article will focus onraised the substantive issue 22 of whether the fourth amendment prohibits an
I.N.S. agent from stopping and questioning a pedestrian 23 absent a reasonable
suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that such a person is an alien
unlawfully within the United States. The determination of this issue depended upon the disposition of other questions: whether the minimal

questioning in Illinois Migrant Council constituted sufficient intrusion as to
warrant the same protection afforded seizures which might be more drastic
or forcible; and further, whether the proper standard was one which required

a suspicion not of mere alienage, but of illegal alienage. After dismissing as
unrealistic any distinctions between "mere questioning" and "forcible detention", the district court held that the minimal nature of the intrusion lowered

the standard of justification only from the level of probable cause to that of
reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage. As a basis for its decision, the court
looked to the few Supreme Court cases that have touched upon this issue.
THE SUPREME COURT CASES

The first case in which the Supreme Court discussed the fourth amendment standards governing intrusions short of an arrest was Terry v. Ohio.24
There, the Court, while acknowledging a distinction between detentions
amounting to an arrest and those short of an arrest, made it clear that even

temporary detentions are covered by the fourth amendment: "[W]henever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away,
he has 'seized' that person."'2 5 Such a seizure must be evaluated on the basis

justifying stops should be lowered because of the alienage of subjects is no more
persuasive. The I.N.S. agents are not prohibited from routinely communicating with and
monitoring known registered aliens. They are only prohibited from stopping and
questioning individuals on mere suspicion of alienage.
22. Whether or not a three judge panel is required, and even if a statute were being
challenged, "[i]t is clear . . .that no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the
Constitution." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
23. While United States v. Brignoni-Ponce involved a vehicular stop, there is no
apparent reason for requiring a higher standard for vehicular stops than for pedestrian
stops. The automobile occupies no privileged place in the law which would justify such
a distinction. "Indeed to the extent that differing Fourth Amendment standards have
developed among persons, places and vehicles, the less stringent have been applied to
vehicles because of the exigent circumstances inherent in their operation." Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882, 898 (N.D. I1l. 1975) (citations omitted).
Actually the cases cited by the court distinguished between vehicles and places and
did not expressly concern pedestrians. Nevertheless, they are authority for the proposition that the automobile does not occupy a place requiring an especially high standard.
24. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
25. Id. at 16. The government apparently did not dispute plaintiffs' contention
that the encounters complained of constituted stops, or that such stops are seizures
subject to fourth amendment principles. The courts have fairly consistently found that
detentions occurred where persons were questioned by a law enforcement authority:
United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973) (policeman waving jaywalker over
to police car); United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1973) (policeman

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

of the governmental interest involved in that seizure and the severity of the
intrusion which the seizure entails. 26 Further, "in justifying the particular
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."' 27

Thus, once a seizure has been found to have

occurred, the 29seizure must be justified not by "inarticulable hunches ' '2s or
"good faith", but by "specific and articulable facts",3 0 which, given the

governmental interest involved, would warrant the particular intrusion en3
tailed by that seizure. 1
Non-border searches 32 by I.N.S. "roving patrols" were found to be

tapping on car window and asking driver to produce driver's license); United States v.
DeMarco, 488 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1973) (policeman requesting occupants of van to
accompany him to station "to clear up this mess"); United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d
622 (8th Cir. 1971) (policeman walking up to parked car, flashing badge, telling driver
to roll down window). But see United States v. Cross, 437 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971);
Government of Virgin Islands v. Kirnon, 377 F. Supp. 601 (D. St. Croix 1974). In the
recent alien cases, even those cases otherwise in conflict with Illinois Migrant Council v.
Pilliod agree that temporary questioning constitutes a seizure: Shu Fuk Cheung v.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 476 F.2d 1180, 1181 (8th Cir. 1973); Cheung Tin
Wong v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 468 F.2d 1123, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
and Au Yi Lau v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229
(10th Cir. 1973).
26. 392 U.S. at 21. Accord, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37
(1967).
27. 392 U.S. at 21. Technically, no definitive "seizure" standard was established
by the holding in Terry v. Ohio, since a frisk was also involved. "In Terry v. Ohio...
the Court declined expressly to decide whether facts not amounting to probable cause
could justify an 'investigatory seizure' short of an arrest, but it approved a limited
search." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2580 (1975) (citation
omitted).
28. 392 U.S. at 22.
29. Id. at 22.
30. Id. at 21.
31. For a general discussion of the developing law in this area, see Weisgall, Stop,
Search and Seize: The Emerging Doctrine of Founded Suspicion, 9 U. SAN FRAN. L.
REV. 219 (1974).

32. The law covering searches and seizures at the border or its functional equivalent has been succinctly summarized in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973).

It is undoubtedly within the power of the Federal Government to exclude
aliens from the country. It is also without doubt that this power can be
effectuated by routine inspections and searches of individuals or conveyances
seeking to cross our borders. As the Court stated in Carroll v. United States:
'Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because
of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to
identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may
be lawfully brought in.'
Whatever the permissible scope of intrusiveness of a routine border search
might be, searches of this kind may in certain circumstances take place not
only at the border itself but at its functional equivalents as well. For example,
searches at an established station near the border, at a point marking the
confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border, might be functional equivalents of border searches. For another example, a search of the
passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a non-
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covered by the fourth amendment in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States.33
The Court held that probable cause was required in non-border searches of
automobiles in spite of the governmental interest involved. Pointing out that
34
the officers had not even satisfied the "reasonable suspicion" standard
enunciated in Terry, the Court said:
It is not enough to argue, as does the Government, that the problem
of deterring unlawful entry by aliens across long expanses of
national boundaries is a serious one. The needs of law enforcement stand in 'a constant tension with the Constitution's protections
of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It is
precisely the predictability of these pressures
that counsels a reso35
lute loyalty to constitutional safeguards.
Thus, the special problems and needs of the I.N.S. were found to warrant no
special standard in Almeida-Sanchez.
Not until United States v. Brignoni-Ponce36 did the Court actually
apply the Terry language to a "stop" by the I.N.S. Automobile stops which
were not even founded on a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained
aliens were there held unconstitutional. The government had argued that
the intrusion involved in the stop was so slight, 37 and the governmental
interest so substantial, that the stops were warranted. The Court replied
that "the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimum
intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing
the border" 38 only reduced the required justification from probable cause to
reasonable suspicion. 39 The effect of Brignoni-Ponce is that I.N.S. officers
may not stop vehicles absent specific articulable facts sufficient to support a
reasonable suspicion that such vehicles contain "aliens who may be illegally
in the country. ' 40 The Court expressly reserved the question of whether
agents may stop persons "reasonably believed to be aliens when there is no
reason to believe they are illegally in the country."'41 The district court in
Illinois Migrant Council, relying on these three Supreme Court cases,
answered this question in the negative. In so doing, it rejected the twoprong standard developed by the District of Columbia and Eighth Circuits.
stop flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a

border search.
413 U.S. at 272-73 (citations omitted).
33. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
34. Id. at 268.
35. Id. at 273.
36. 95 S.Ct. 2574 (1975).
37. "The intrusion is modest. The Government tells us that a stop by a roving
patrol 'usually consumes no more than a minute' . . . . According to the Government

'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is a response to a brief question or two
and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United
States.'" Id. at 2579.
38. Id. at2580.
39. Id. at 2580-82.
40. Id. at 2582.
41. Id. at 2582 n.9.
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MERE QUESTIONING V. FORCIBLE DETENTION

There seems to be little doubt that even temporary questioning of the
sort present in Illinois Migrant Council constitutes a seizure. 42 The question
is whether the same level of justification is required for such questioning as
43
would be required for other detentions short of arrest.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in Au Yi Lau v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,4 4 developed a two-prong standard for I.N.S. stops
and interrogations. Where "mere questioning, which assumes the individual's cooperation," is involved, that Circuit would require only that the
subject was reasonably believed to be of alien origin. 45 But where temporary "forcible detentions" are resorted to, the Court would require the higher
standard of "circumstances creating a reasonable suspicion, not arising to the
level of probable cause to arrest, that the individual so detained is illegally in
this country". 46 The rationale behind using two separate standards lies in
the balancing of the nature of the intrusion and the governmental interest
involved. The District of Columbia Circuit views "mere questioning" as less
obtrusive than "forcible detention", and thus as requiring a lesser justifica-

tion.
The District of Columbia Circuit's dividing line between their two
categories is not clear. The "forcible detentions" category was created in Au
Yi Lau, where suspects were stopped while attempting to flee a restaurant in
order to avoid the I.N.S. agents. 47
The "mere questioning" category
apparently grew out of the case of Yam Sang Kwai v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,4 8 in which an I.N.S. officer entered the restaurant

and questioned the petitioner concerning his right to be in the United
States. 49 The difference between the two situations seems to be that in Au
Yi Lau the subjects attempted to flee, and were restrained, while in Yam
Sang Kwai, there was no attempt to flee. No doubt, the subject of the
questioning in Yam Sang Kwai would have been prevented from leaving
42. See note 25 supra.
43. Government Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 6-11, Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
44. 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
45. Id. at 222.
46. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
47. As the officers proceeded towards the kitchen, they observed a person of
Chinese extraction . . . scurrying through the dining room to the main entrance door. One officer . . . followed him to the door, stopped him, identified himself .

.

. and asked the individual . . . to accompany him to the

kitchen. As the two headed back to the kitchen, a second employee . . . was
met by them as he appeared to be hurrying towards the front door. He was
requested by Officer Burns to go to the kitchen for a talk. Lam did so momentarily, but suddenly darted through a side door only to encounter Officer
Lamoreaux who asked if he was off a ship and received an affirmative answer.
445 F.2d at 219.
48. 411 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1970).
49. The language barrier was insurmountable, and the subject sent for a friend to
interpret. Meanwhile, he went about his business until the friend arrived. Id. at 684.
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had he tried, just as those in Au Yi Lau were. If this is the case, under the
District of Columbia standards, it might be expedient for a suspect to attempt
to flee, since the higher standard of justification could then be invoked. But
presumably an attempt to flee would, in itself, justify a "forcible detention"
because of its highly suspicious nature. 50 The District of Columbia Circuit
had difficulty applying its own standard in the very set of facts out of which
the standard was developed. "In the case of petitioner Yim, indeed, it is not
even clear that there was a detention against his will since, once accosted in
his apparent progress towards the front door, he appears to have acquiesced
readily to the request by Officer Burns to accompany him to the kitchen." 5' 1
It thus appears that even an initial attempt to escape would be insufficient,
and that there must be continuous resistance, in order to raise the level of the
encounter to a forced detention. The other subjects, according to the court,
"manifested their purpose to flee in a more positive manner, and would have
gotten away if they had not been affirmatively intercepted.15 2 The difference is a very subtle one, if indeed any difference does exist.
The District of Columbia standard was applied by the Eighth Circuit
in Shu Fuk Cheung v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,53 where the

Court found that the questioning fit the "mere questioning" standard, but
that the subject's answers "were, evidently, of such an unsatisfactory nature" that probable cause for arrest existed. 54 Applying this line of reasoning to the Illinois Migrant Council facts, the "mere questioning" of Larry
Sandoval could have led to probable cause for an arrest had he continued to
refuse to "satisfactorily substantiate his right to be in the United States." 55
Since Sandoval made no attempt to flee, presumably the encounter would
have been "mere questioning". On the other hand, his lack of cooperation
might have converted it to a "forcible detention". In either event, Larry
Sandoval, and the Chinese aliens in Au Yi Lau, Yam Sang Kwai, and Shu

Fuk Cheung were clearly detained and the presence of the -force behind the
detention varied only in that in one case it was exercised, while in the
others it was merely present and waiting to be exercised if called for. The
district court in Illinois Migrant Council recognized this problem when it expressly rejected both the two-prong standard of Au Yi Lau and an underlying assumption of that standard, the existence of a meaningful distinction
between the two categories of encounters. The court noted that the line be50. "It was the response to the appearance of the immigration officers, which...
sufficed to create a reasonable suspicion." 445 F.2d at 223. See also Illinois Migrant
1975).
Council v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill.
51. 445 F.2d at 223-24.
52. Id. at 224.
53. 476F.2d 1180 (8thCir. 1973).
54. Id. at 1182. There the court did not explain what the subject's answers had

been.
55. Id. at 1181.
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tween mere questioning and forcible detention is too faint and too easily
crossed. 5 6 Explaining, the court said:
Any agent worthy of the calling expects cooperation and knows
how to get it. Implicit in the introduction of the agent and the
initial questioning is a show of authority to which the average
person encountered will feel obliged to stop and respond. Few
will feel that they can 'walk away or refuse to answer. And if
they should, Larry Sandoval's experience teaches the consequences.
He was grabbed
and placed in the agents' car to be taken 'to
57
Chicago.'
Even assuming that there is some kind of distinction which can be made
as to whether an encounter constitutes mere questioning as opposed to
forcible detention, the difficulty of differentiating would lead to an after-thefact determination of which standard was appropriate to the facts of the
encounter. Illinois Migrant Council, on the other hand, sets one standard
for such encounters such that the agent knows, at the time of the encounter,
what the requisite suspicion must be, namely that of illegal alienage. Under
the District of Columbia Circuit rule, the type of suspicion necessary would
depend upon a distinction which even that court had difficulty applying.
While there is considerable variation in the types of encounters which
may occur between law enforcement officials and other persons, the Supreme
Court has never held that each variation requires its own separate standard
of justification. Instead, the Court has viewed encounters through categories. The fourth amendment applies to two distinct types of encounters,
searches and seizures. The Supreme Court has further divided the category of searches into full-scale searches and frisks, with each of these
categories having its own standard. Only two forms of seizure have been
specified by the Court, arrests and stops. Just as a frisk is a less intrusive
form of search than a full-scale search, a stop is a milder form of seizure
than an arrest, and in each case the standards are thereby lessened.
The types of seizures which constitute an arrest vary in form. An
officer need not announce an arrest or actually exercise overt physical
restraint over a person for that person to be under arrest. Yet one standard
of justification is applied for any arrest, no matter what level of intrusion the
arrest involves or how the arrest is made. Similarly, the wide range of
possible encounters which would constitute a stop should not require separate
standards of justification either.
Given the doubtful viability of a "mere questioning"-"forcible detention"
distinction, the high degree of difficulty in applying such a distinction, either
in the field or in the courtroom, and the failure of the Supreme Court to
56. 398 F. Supp. at 899.

57. Id. at 899. The experience of the Chinese aliens in Au Yi Lau v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service also teaches the consequences.
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require different standards for different types of arrests, the use of one
standard for stops of aliens appears warranted. In fact, the decisions appear
to require at a minimum a suspicion of illegal activity before any "seizure"
can take place.
SINGLE STANDARD:

REASONABLE SUSPICION OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY

The language in Terry as well as in the more recent search and seizure
cases indicates that the Supreme Court is not ready to permit seizures on any
basis short of reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Thus, it was pointed
out in Terry that even though probable cause is not required when the
intrusion does not reach the level of an arrest or a full-scale search, 5 8 "the
notions which underlie both the warrant procedure and the requirement of
probable cause remain fully relevant in this context." 59 There is certainly
no more basic notion underlying probable cause than that there be a basis
for belief that an offense has been or is being committed. 0 The Court in
Terry also noted that the intrusion must be reasonably related to the
governmental interest involved. Since the ultimate purpose of the government in stopping aliens is the detection of illegal aliens, it seems to follow
that the intrusions should to the extent possible be limited to illegal aliens.
The Supreme Court cases since Terry also suggest that a suspicion of
illegal activity is necessary. In Adams v. Williams6 the Court discussed the
62
justification for brief stops in terms of a suspicion of criminal activity.
While Brignoni-Ponce reserved the question of whether the suspicion must
be of illegal alienage since the facts did not require such decision, the
language used in the text continued to phrase the standard in terms of illegal
alienage.63
58. 392 U.S.at 20-22.
59. Id. at 20.
60. 'The substance of all the definitions' of probable cause 'is a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt'.. ...Probable
cause exists where the facts and
circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense is being committed.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).

One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and
detection. It is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.
392 U.S. at 22.
61. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
62. The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply
shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. A
brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may
be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.
Id. at 145.
63. 95 S.Ct. at 2580, 2582.
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Thus, the cases appear to assume or imply that the fourth amendment
requires at least a suspicion that illegal activity is afoot before a person's
freedom of movement may be interrupted by a stop. If one views illegal
activity and the detection thereof to be the basis for allowing seizures, it is
reasonable to view the fourth amendment as requiring some suspicion of
illegality as a prerequisite to any seizure, even one constituting a minimal
intrusion. This approach, combined with the view that the fourth amendment should be applied initially through basic categories of seizures, results
in the conclusion that no stops may be made of persons absent the requisite
reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage. This standard is applicable to all
stops, whether brief or more extended in nature, whether there is a direct
restraint exercised by the agent or a more subtle assertion of authority. The
agent may have broad discretion, however, in determining whether specific
facts warrant such a reasonable suspicion. An agent is probably more
equipped to make this type of factual determination than to make a
determination of whether one technical legal concept applies as opposed to
another. It may even be appropriate for a reviewing court to consider the
relative intrusiveness of the particular stop in evaluating whether there was
an abuse of discretion as applied to the specific circumstances. In this way,
a flexibility could be allowed while maintaining the important element of
some form of suspicion that a violation of law is occurring or has occurred
before persons may be stopped and interrogated. The operation of this
approach may be seen more clearly in the examination of the practical effect
of Illinois Migrant Council.
PRACTICAL EFFECTS

'In view of the fact that fourth amendment application does involve a
balancing between governmental interest and intrusion upon individual
freedom, the governmental interest must not be unduly stifled and the
individual freedom must not be unreasonably restricted if the amendment is
to be properly applied. Thus an examination of how the Illinois Migrant
Council standard might operate in practice is necessitated.
Both Brignoni-Ponce and Illinois Migrant Council gave examples of

factors which would be relevant in establishing the requisite reasonable
suspicion. Since Brignoni-Ponce involved a vehicular stop somewhat near
the border, the Court focused its recitation on factors relevant to such
stops. 64 In that context, characteristics of the area and its proximity to the
border, the usual patterns of traffic on 'the particular road, and information
about recent illegal border crossings all may be taken into consideration.
Aspects of the vehicle itself, such as station wagons with compartments
commonly used for concealment of aliens, or the fact that a vehicle appears
64. Id. at 2578.
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to be heavily loaded may also be relied upon in establishing reasonable
suspicion. Specifically, "obvious attempts to evade officers can support a
reasonable suspicion.1 65 In addition, the I.N.S. officer may consider such
subjective factors as the person's mode of dress and haircut and may assess
the facts "in light of his experience in detecting illegal entry and smuggling."65
Although the Court did not indicate what combination of factors would
be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, it appears that the more
subjective and less persuasive factors would be insufficient standing alone.
And while it is important to note that the Court's discussion was directed
toward vehicular stops made near the border, it is equally important to
recognize the clear intention to create a rather broad discretion to be
exercised by experienced agents in the field.
In Illinois Migrant Council, this broad discretion was also applied to
stops made by I.N.S. agents of pedestrians far away from the border. The
district court noted:
[W]hile apparent Mexican ancestry is not enough to support a reasonable suspicion that the person is either an alien or illegally in
,the country, it is a relevant circumstance which can be taken into
account along with dress, hairstyle and speech. Furtive conduct
and flight, particularly when the person has become aware of an
agent's identity and presence, may justify suspicion as may a person's failure to produce
evidence of his identification when it is
67
requested by another.
Thus, it appears that the I.N.S. retains substantial leeway in consideration of
subjective factors in justifying stops and interrogations. While the question
remains as to what accumulation of factors is required, the language of both
decisions indicates a willingness to allow the I.N.S. fairly broad discretion
while insisting on basic restraint. This broad discretion, combined with the
requirement by the district court of reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, is
designed to create a system whereby the I.N.S. is able to perform its
important duties while hopefully being prevented from abusing the rights of
others in its zeal for dealing with immigration problems.
In addition to the use of such discretion, I.N.S. agents continue to have
investigative methods other than stops at their disposal. If an agent suspects
an individual of being an illegal alien, ,but does not have available the specific
facts necessary to justify a reasonable suspicion, the subject may be placed
65. Id. at 2582.
66. Id. at 2582.
67. 398 F. Supp. at 899. The reference to "failure to produce identification"
presumably refers to such failure when the subject has received such a request on a basis
other than the encounters herein. For example, if an I.N.S. agent witnessed or learned
of a person's failure to produce identification upon entering a hospital, such failure would
be a relevant factor toward reasonable suspicion.
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under limited surveillance so that additional information may be obtained. In
the case of Larry Sandoval, the I.N.S. agents required very little basis upon
which to satisfy themselves of Sandoval's citizenship. Given the permissible
use of subjective as well as objective factors and discretion in evaluating such
factors, the agents should be able to obtain information through less obtrusive investigative methods. The same methods for investigation are available to I.N.S. agents as are available to other law enforcement officials. It is
possible for such officers, without revealing their identities or otherwise
bringing embarrassment to the subject of investigation, to obtain more
detailed information, such as the identity of a subject. Once a person's
identity has been obtained, it may be possible to determine that the person is
a citizen or a legally resident alien, 68 or the information obtained may
provide sufficient basis for stopping and questioning the subject.
Another means of dealing with the illegal alien problem is through the
use of stops and searches at borders and border equivalents. While it is no
doubt impossible to completely stop the influx of illegal aliens at the border,
border equivalents, or near the border, it is not clear that the I.N.S. practices
complained of in Illinois Migrant Council are any more effective in solving
the problem. Very few illegal aliens were detected in all of the area control
operations, and yet, many citizens and legal aliens were detained and
interrogated, many of them in embarrassing and debasing circumstances. 69
As the I.N.S. points out, the number of illegal aliens in the country has been
growing rapidly. Yet, the stops utilized in Illinois Migrant Council do not
appear to provide an exceptionally effective tool which offers a solution to
the nation's illegal alien problem.
'Perhaps the most effective means of controlling the illegal alien problem
is to develop meaningful penalties which are enforced against knowing
employers of illegal aliens. A major reason for the entrance of so many
illegal aliens appears to be the fact that jobs are available to Mexicans at
wages above those prevailing in Mexico. It is the ability of the employer to
pay very low wages to the known illegal alien that makes the illegal alien
more attractive than the citizen or legal alien competitor for employment.
Without the cooperation of employers, it is doubtful that the magnitude of
this problem would be what it is today.
In summary, the combination of enforcement methods consisting of
border and border equivalent stops and searches, concentration on employers, surveillance and other conventional indirect investigation, and stops and
interrogations based on reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage leave the
68.

The I.N.S. could check its own files to determine whether the subject is a

registered alien, and if so, whether the person continues in good status. See supra note
21 for a discussion of this case's effect on monitoring legal aliens and note 20 for
examples of such monitoring.

69. 398 F. Supp. at 888-91.
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I.N.S. with sufficient resources in its mission to enforce the nation's. laws.
While the agents would no doubt find their job somewhat facilitated by the
ability to stop anyone whom they believe to be an alien, they, like all
enforcement officials must fit their enforcement methods to the constraints of
the Constitution. The freedom being protected is one about which the
Supreme Court has said, "No right is held more sacred or is more carefully
guarded, by the Common Law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."'70 As
such, the standard protecting that freedom should stand unless the I.N.S.
capacity for enforcing the immigration laws is clearly and severely inhibited
thereby. Given the availability of other enforcement methods, it would
appear that no such inhibition need result.
The converse of the problem discussed above is whether the I.N.S.
agents will be sufficiently restrained by a standard which permits them such
wide discretion. Such factors as hairstyle, and modes of dress and speech
have been identified as relevant in the determination of whether a person
may reasonably be suspected of being an illegal alien. Some of the clothing
worn by Illinois Migrant Council plaintiff Arturo Lopez, a citizen of the
United States, was made in Mexico 71 and presumably many other citizens as
well as legal aliens wear Mexican-made clothing and continue to wear
hairstyles associated with Mexico. Many legal aliens and citizens of this
country speak Spanish as their first, if not only, language. These characteristics are especially likely to apply to those persons of Mexican ancestry who
are proud of their heritage and wish to maintain its cultural traditions while
living in the United States. To make such personal habits the basis for
detention and interrogation would have the effect of penalizing those of
Mexican ancestry who do not conform to the dress and speech patterns of
mainstream America. The fact that Arturo Lopez was wearing Mexican
made clothing may indicate that the district court does not intend clothing or
even speech to be sufficient to justify stops. Certainly, the more incriminating factor of flight upon the realization of an agent's presence is a better
basis for reasonable suspicion. Nevertheless, just as the balancing process
requires unwelcome restraints from the I.N.S. point of view, it may be that
the application of the Illinois Migrant Council standard will also involve the
use of some factors which normally would not be indicators of illegal activity.
The vagueness inherent in the standard is probably required by the nature of
the problem and the application to particular sets of circumstances will
inevitably rest with the courts. Until such application, there remains the
potential for circumvention of the intent of the standard by resourceful I.N.S.
70. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967), quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250,251 (1891).
71. 398 F.Supp. at 888.
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agents or the undue frustration of the ability of I.N.S. agents to perform in
the field. Hopefully, a successful blending of interests will result, such that
the nation's immigration laws will be enforced without unreasonable encroachment upon the fourth amendment rights of citizens and legal aliens.
CONCLUSION

The encounters of Illinois Migrant Council have been evaluated
through a balancing of the unquestionably legitimate governmental purpose
of regulating immigration and the invasion of the subjects' fourth amendment
rights. This balancing process is by no means an easy one in such a case,
especially with such little guidance from the Supreme Court on the subject of
stops. 72 But important as the governmental interest involved is,
[The fourth amendment rights involved are] not mere second-class
rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among
deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population,
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every
heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and the
most 73
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.
Any lessening of the standards which constitute the day-to-day embodiment of this indispensable freedom should be cautiously and reluctantly
undertaken. To permit a standard of justification which requires not even a
suspicion of illegality would be too drastic a step for such purposes as are
herein involved. The district court in Illinois Migrant Council has enunciated a standard which preserves this requirement but which permits fairly
broad leeway for the evaluation of surrounding circumstances, objective and
subjective, upon which reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage may be based.
This standard creates a framework with which the I.N.S. can work in
attempting to fulfill its statutory mission, while simultaneously adhering to its
constitutional mandate under the fourth amendment. Perhaps clarification
and even adjustment will be required to prevent the frustration of either the
statutory mission or the constitutional mandate. But in forging a solution to
the difficult problem at hand, Illinois Migrant Council should provide a
reasonable standard with which to begin.
RONALD

A.

STEVENS

72. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce was the first case in which the Supreme Court
dealt with a factual setting involving a stop short of arrest without an accompanying
search of any kind.
73.

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949)

(Jackson, J., dissenting),

quoted with favor, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).

